In this study, we investigate the market reaction to the appointments/departures of directors from various demographic backgrounds to/from the boards of public firms listed at the Borsa Istanbul between 2012 and 2014, via a unique handcollected dataset. Our findings suggest that investors in Turkish capital markets do not appear to value the gender or nationality of members of board of directors. However, they appear to value the age of directors. When relatively older directors leave the boards of public firms, significant negative market reaction is observed.
Introduction
Demographic diversity in the boards of public firms has attracted substantial attention in the recent decade. Various regulations regarding diversity in the boards of public firms in developed countries such as Norway highlight the importance given to the issue of diversity in the boardroom. Regulators not only in Norway, but also in other countries have recently set regulations such as quotas regarding the minimum percentage of female directors that must serve on the boards of public firms. The most recent Principles of Corporate Governance (PCG) in Turkey also states that board of directors of public firms should have at least twenty five percent of their members as female directors. Yet, this Article in the PCG is not mandatory. It has more of a comply-or-explain nature. However, it is quite possible that it could become mandatory in the future, considering the recent developments in corporate governance environment in Turkey over the last five years. Therefore, it is important to investigate this issue from the point of view of different parties. Just because regulations regarding a specific issue lead to an improved corporate world in developed countries does not necessarily posit that similar outcomes would be observed in less developed emerging countries with different corporate backgrounds and cultures. Previous studies investigating the relationship between diversity (especially gender diversity) and firm performance in Turkish capital markets provide evidence of a positive relationship (Ocak, 2013; Solakoglu, 2013; Karayel and Dogan, 2014; Ararat et al., 2015) . In this study, we investigate the issue from the point of view of investors in capital markets. We investigate the market reaction to the appointments/departures of directors with various demographic backgrounds to/from boards of public firms listed at the Borsa Istanbul. To our best knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the issue of boardroom diversity via an event study for Turkish capital markets. We believe that our study provides valuable insight into understanding how the market views diversity in an emerging market and could benefit policymakers in future discussions regarding any potential diversity-based quotas for public firms.
Among the potential benefits of diversity in boardrooms, we could list improved and diverse set of skills, enchanced quality and speed of decision making, more effective leadership, more effective problem-solving skills and improved creativity (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Anderson et al., 2011; Dobbin and Jung, 2011 ). Yet, despite these potential benefits, the existence of directors from various demographic backgrounds could also be costly as a result of potential in-group biases, and conflicts and communication problems (Shin, 2012 ).
When we consider directors from each specific diverse group, we can argue that they each could have potential benefits and costs related to their existence on company boards. For example, the existence of female directors on board could be helpful in creating a female worker friendly environment, setting up career goals for female employees at lower levels, and improving the understanding of female market segmentation for companies, especially for those in specific industries (Singh et al., 2008; Sealy and Singh, 2010; Tate and Yang, 2015) . Yet, their existence could bring the potential costs of diversity to the boardrooms as we mentioned previously (Shin, 2012 ).
When we think about foreign directors in boardrooms, we should first admit that as a result of increased globalization; foreign institutional shareholders, foreign direct investments and global partners are not rare in today's world (Heijltjes et al., 2003) . Even in the absence of Emrah Arıoğlu -Metin Borak these connections, many firms have relationships with global markets as a result of their importing and/or exporting activities. Therefore, the existence of foreign directors in boardrooms, assuming that they could help understanding the dynamics of global partnerships and foreign markets, could help companies, especially as a result of their experience and knowledge of global markets (Van Veen and Marsman, 2008; Greve et al., 2009; Masulis et al., 2012; and Daniel et al., 2013, Morikawa, 2014) . In addition, their existence could potentially be important in signaling firms' intentions for globalization, improving a firm's reputation in the market, and providing valuable external connections such as those to business, social and political circles to the boards (Ramaswamy and Li, 2001; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; Masulis et al., 2012 ). Yet, in addition to the potential costs of increased diversity that we have mentioned previously, the existence of foreign directors could posit some additional costs. For example, if the director resides abroad, she could have less access to information, as well as having difficulties visiting the headquarters located in Turkey. In addition, the consequences of international travelling such as adjusting to time zones, and language barriers could be costly for the firm (Masulis et al., 2012; Piekkari et al., 2013) .
Lastly, we focus on age diversity in boardrooms. As directors get older, it is possible that they could require stronger explicit incentives in their jobs, would be less familiar with more recent and sophisticated techniques that would be helpful in performing a board duty, and would become less effective (Gibbons and Murpy, 1992; Core et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001 ). In addition, they might lack the incentives to show their worth to the market as they get closer to retirement age; and as opposed to younger directors, they could potentially lack risk-aversion. However, older directors could potentially provide wisdom and stability in the boardroom and help younger directors in their career paths through sharing their own experiences with them (Anderson et al., 2011) .
The majority of previous studies provide evidence suggesting that the potential positive effects of female directors outweigh the costs. Various studies provide evidence in support of the potential positive effects of the existence of female directors on various corporate issues such as improved CEO performance-turnover sensitivity, increased board meeting attendance, and improved performance and firm value (Francoeur et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013 , Peni, 2014 . Yet, some studies are unable find a meaningful relationship between gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance (Rose, 2007; Carter et al., 2007) . Abdullah (2014) , on the other hand, provides evidence suggestive of a negative relationship.
In terms of empirical studies investigating nationality-based diversity in the boardrooms, Masulis et al. (2012) provide evidence suggestive of the existence of a negative relationship between foreign directors and firm performance. On the other hand, Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) , Ntim (2013) , and Daniel et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that foreign directors have a positive effect on firm value. Lastly, various empirical studies investigating director age provide evidence suggesting that age diversity has a positive effect on firm performance (Wegge et al., 2008; McIntryre et al., 2007) . On the other hand, studies such as Korniotis and Kumar (2011), and Waelchli and Zeller (2013) provide contradictory evidence.
Motivated by these discussions and empirical evidence regarding demographic diversity in the boardroom, in this study, we investigate how investors in Turkish capital markets value the Does the Market Price Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom? Evidence From an Emerging Market appointments and departures of directors from various demographic backgrounds to/from the boards of public firms quoted at the Borsa Istanbul.
Data and Methodology
In this study, the market reaction to director changes from various demographic backgrounds is investigated via a standard event-study methodology. The gender sample includes 37 (28) female director appointments (departures) and 394 (310) male director appointments (departures). On the other hand, the nationality sample includes 56 (53) foreign director appointments (departures) and 375 (284) domestic director appointments (departures). Lastly, the age sample includes the appointments (departures) of 87 (86) younger directors and the appointments (departures) of 53 (29) older directors.
Relevant director changes are identified manually through the examination of all the announcements submitted to the Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) by firms quoted at the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in the sample period. If a corporate event is not announced to the public through the PDP, that event is not included in the sample. The sample period covers January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2014. Appointments and departures of directors in financial firms are excluded from the sample since the 3 Factor Model (3FM) and the 4 Factor Model (4FM) are employed in expected return estimations. The sample includes only unexpected director changes. To prevent any potential effects of survivorship bias, announcements made by firms that are delisted in subsequent periods are also included in the sample. Throughout the study, a director is classified as younger if she is in the 25 th percentile of director age, and she is classified as an older director if she is in the 75 th percentile.
Other data needed for the analyses are gathered from official data providers of the Borsa Istanbul and the documents provided in the official company web pages. Director age, gender and nationality data are hand-collected from the annual reports. Following the concerns discussed in Basdas and Oran (2014) , adjusted price series are employed for return calculations. The majority of studies employing event-study methodology for Turkish capital markets use either the simple market model, or the market adjusted returns, or the capital asset pricing model as the market model. However, Ahern (2009) argues that these models could potentially generate biased results. Only Tahaoglu and Guner (2011) employ the 3FM. In this study, we apply the 4FM for expected return estimations. For robustness tests, we also report findings based on the application of the 3FM.
The 3FM is developed in Fama and French (1993) and is employed to explain the variation in stock returns. The 4FM, which is a modified version of the 3FM, is developed in Carhart (1997) and it incorporates momentum (MOM) factor into the 3FM, which also captures the momentum anomaly. These models are suggested to outperform standard capital asset pricing models in explaining the variation in stock returns by numerous studies regarding developed markets French, 1993 & . Also, Ahern (2009) provides evidence suggesting that these models generate less skewed abnormal returns. Unlu (2012) provides similar evidence for Turkish capital markets.
Since the goal of this study is not to test whether or not these two models capture the variation in stock returns, we do not discuss the construction of the factors employed in the models. Once the factors are constructed, these models are employed to estimate expected return of stock i on day m, based on various estimation period specifications reported in the Emrah Arıoğlu -Metin Borak tables in the following sections. The models can be stated as below following Kosowski et al. (2006) , and Fama and French (2012) 
where RFs are the daily risk-free rates of returns. RMs employed in the above specifications are the average daily returns for all the firms quoted at BIST. Once expected returns are estimated via these models, the difference between the realized return and the expected return is the abnormal return. This procedure is repeated for each firm in the sample. Then, these returns are employed to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative abnormal average returns (CAARs).
Based on earlier studies, 240 previous trading days is employed as the estimation window. As it is standard in the literature, the estimation window does not include the days immediately prior to the event. We employ (-5,+5), (-1,+1) and (0) as alternative event windows. The significance of these CARs is investigated using various tests commonly employed in the literature, so that the distribution of CARs is taken into account. We employ the BMP test and the cross-sectional t-test as the parametric tests, and the sign test as the nonparametric test.
The statistical specifications for the standard cross-sectional t-test can be shows as below:
where S AARt is the standard deviation across firms at time t as shown below:
where S CAAR is the standard deviation of cumulative average abnormal returns as shown below:
On the other hand, the statistical specifications for the BMP test can be shown as below:
where ASAR t is calculated as: 
Results
Our findings regarding the market reaction to the appointment and departures of female and male directors are presented in Table 1 . The Table shows that the CAAR on the announcement day of female director appointments is 0.157%, whereas it is 0.134% for departure announcements. On the other hand, the CAARs for the three days surrounding the announcements are 0.563% and 0.216% for female director appointments and departures, respectively. The Table also shows that the CAARs for the eleven days surrounding the announcements are 0.534% and -2.930% for female director appointments and departures, respectively. Even though the magnitude of the market reaction gets substantially larger for female director departures as the event window expands, it should be noted that the potential effects of Emrah Arıoğlu -Metin Borak confounding events could be pronounced with the extended event window. None of the CAARs for female director appointments and departures are statistically significant at 95% level, regardless of the event window. Overall, the evidence in Table 1 suggests that investors do not appear to react significantly to the appointments and departures of female director in public firms. The evidence presented in Table 4 , which presents results based on different model specifications, is also supportive of this conclusion. Table 1 also presents the market reactions surrounding the appointments/departures of male directors to/from boards of public firms. Once again, none of the CAARs are statistically significant at 95% for male director changes, except for the eleven day CAAR surrounding male director departures, according to the BMP test. Based on the evidence in Table 1 and Table 4 , we cannot suggest that investors in Turkish capital markets value the existence of female directors on the boards of public firms. Next, we present our findings regarding the market reactions surrounding the appointments and departures of foreign and Turkish directors. The results are presented in Table  2 . What the Table shows is that the CAAR on the day of the announcement of foreign director appointments is 0.133%, and it is 0.097% on the day of the announcement of foreign director departures. As the event window extends to three days and eleven days, the CAARs for the appointments of foreign directors change signs and become -0.119% and -0.322%, whereas they become -0.416% and -0.858% for the departures of foreign directors. The Table also presents the CAARs surrounding the appointments and departures of Turkish directors. However, the CAARs for neither the foreign director changes nor the Turkish director changes are statistically significant at 95% level. Table 4 provides similar evidence. Based on this evidence, we are unable to suggest that investors in Turkish capital markets value the existence of foreign directors on the boards of public firms.
Lastly, we present our findings regarding the market reaction to the appointment and departures of relatively younger (under the age of 49) and older (over the age of 62) directors in Table 3 . What is observed in Table 3 is that the CAARs surrounding the appointments and departures of relatively younger directors are positive on the announcement day and the three days surrounding it. As the event window extends to eleven days, the signs of the CAARs become negative. However, none of the CAARs are statistically significant. The Table presents findings based on the 3 Factor Model as the market return and the return of the XTUM index as the market return. A director under the age of 49 is considered as a younger director and a director over the age of 62 is considered as an older director.
On the other hand, the CAARs surrounding the appointments of relatively older directors to public firms' boards are positive but statistically insignificant. However, when we Emrah Arıoğlu -Metin Borak consider the CAARs surrounding the departures of relatively older directors, we observe some surprising results. The CAAR on the announcement day is -0.795%. The CAARs for the three days and the eleven days surrounding the departures are -1.364% and -3.4615, respectively. All three CAARs are statistically significant. The findings in Table 4 also support these results. Based on these findings, we can suggest that investors in Turkish capital markets value the age of directors and they react negatively when a relatively older director leaves the board of directors.
Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the market reaction to the appointments/departures of directors from various demographic backgrounds to/from boards of public firms listed at the Borsa Istanbul. The findings suggest that investors do not value the existence of female or foreign directors on the boards of public firms. This could be considered as suggesting that investors do not believe that the potential benefits associated with the existence of female or foreign directors would outweigh the potential costs. On the other hand, some could argue that the fact that Turkey is still a patriarchal society could have an effect on the findings related to gender. However, if that was the case, we could probably expect to observe negative market reaction surrounding the announcements of female director appointments to boards. Yet, the results suggest the opposite. Still, other studies (mentioned earlier) provide evidence that the existence of female directors on public firms' boards in Turkey have positive effects on firm performance. Therefore, just because investors do not react to their appointments would not necessarily imply that regulations calling for increased female existence on boards would be misleading. After all, it would be dense ignorance to deny the benefits that female directors would bring to the boardroom.
Our findings also suggest that investors react significantly negatively to the departure of relatively older directors from the boards of public firms. This could be considered as suggesting that investors value the stability and wisdom that older directors could provide the boards with. When these directors leave the boards, investors would think that the forgone wisdom could have negative effects on firm value. Alternatively, the negative result could be an outcome of the nature of corporate world in Turkey. As opposed to Anglo-Saxon countries, Turkey is a country where family ownership is not rare in corporate world. Thus, it is possible that these relatively older directors are founders or members of the founding families of companies. Therefore, when they leave the boards, investors could assume that the next generation would not be as success in the management of companies. And consequently firm value would be affected negatively.
In future studies, researchers can investigate the potential factors that affect the likelihood of firms appointing or removing directors from various backgrounds.
